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The emergence of the “Islamic State” or Da’esh in the Syrian war brought a whole new dimension to the war
on terror. To counter the “Islamic State” ideology, Islamic scholars from all around the world issued a document
titled “Open Letter to Baghdadi” containing refutations towards the “Islamic State”. There are a number of issues
that this document may have clarified, such as the refutation towards the “Islamic State” claim of “global caliphate”.
However, there are quite a number of problematic points which may be counterproductive to the purpose of this
letter in the first place. It is the objective of this article to identify some of these problems which may include a
lack of representation of prominent Islamic schools of thought, incorrect application of Islamic law, or lack of
observation on actions conducted by the “Islamic State”.
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The Syrian and Iraqi war is probably the largest ongoing
humanitarian crisis currently ongoing. In Syria alone, it
has been estimated that around 211,000 people have
been killed and over 7.6 million people have been
displaced since March 2011 until March 2015 (Syrian
Network for Human Rights or SNHR, cited in World
Bulletin, 2015).
The group “Islamic State” (referred to as Da’esh),
formerly the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” or ISIS,
seemed to become the actor which has most attention from
the world. Different reports reveal different numbers, but
they all show that the civilian deaths caused by the Syrian
Government is overwhelmingly larger compared to those
caused by Da’esh (the SNHR, for example, reports that
Da’esh killed a little over a thousand civilians, while the
Syrian Government killed 176,678). However, it seems that
the world is more united against Da’esh.
Although initially being a branch of Al Qaeda, Da’esh
has defected and replaced Al Qaeda as the number one
enemy in the global war on terror, Da’esh had so many
things that Al Qaeda did not have. This includes an
army capable of fighting an open war1 and social mediaCorrespondence: fajrimuhammadin@ugm.ac.id
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territory spreading from parts of Iraq and Syria and
manage it in a way that really closely resembles state-
hood (At-Tamimi 2015a). Their cruelty seems unparal-
leled, which includes but not limited to crucifixion
and burning captives alive.
A large number of extremists have pledged their
support to Da’esh such as the Al-Shabaab of Somalia–
although other extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and
the Taliban are in war with them—and scores of these
extremists are crossing the globe to join and fight for
Da’esh. There are also some areas of Da’esh control be-
yond Iraq and Syria, such as in Libya and Egypt (in Sinai,
see CNN 2015). Da’esh operations do not only include
military attacks in the Syrian and Iraqi war but also terror
operations in other states such as France, Yemen, and
Saudi Arabia.
While there are efforts to combat Da’esh through phy-
sical warfare, the Muslims of the world are fighting them
on a different front as well. This is because the war
against Da’esh–and Islamic extremism in general—needs
more than just military operations but also an approach
to eliminate extremist ideologies.
Although the number of Muslims joining or sympa-
thizing with Da’esh does seem large, the fact remains
that there is an overwhelmingly and exponentially larger
number of Muslims against Da’esh. The Pew Researchle is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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that there is an overwhelming number of Muslims are
against the Da’esh ideology2. Using the same holy sources
of the Islamic belief as Da’esh does, i.e., the Qur’an and
Sunnah, waves of Muslims throughout the world from
various schools of thoughts and interpretation joined in an
“ideology war” to protest and refute Da’esh views of Islam.
Among these efforts, 126 Islamic scholars from all
around the world signed a document called “the Open
Letter to Baghdadi” (hereinafter, the Open Letter), refer-
ring to the Da’esh leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. This
document is 17 pages long (excluding the list of signato-
ries) and contains 24 points of refutation towards Da’esh
and was signed on 19 September 2014. This article focuses
on this Open Letter and sees whether or not it conveys its
message well.
The message of the Open Letter
Da’esh came with an ideology which is not just extreme
but seemingly having scholarly basis. One of their charac-
teristics would be their takfiri ideology (unjustly and too
easily declaring a fellow Muslim as apostate). This ideo-
logy may be the root of how Da’esh easily attacks and kills
fellow Sunni Muslims including non-combatants. Is it easy
to dismiss their actions as “unislamic”? Apparently, it is
not that simple. Al Baghdadi called out democracy as
deceptive (Al-Baghdadi 2014) and declared that its parti-
cipants as apostates. In Da’esh’s handbook Muqarrar fi al-
Tawhid3, they declare as apostates (punishable by death)
all who participate in the process of democracy and seek
judgment through civil laws. This reasoning does seem to
be along the lines of the Qur’an in 5:44 explicitly saying
that those who take laws beside from what Allah revealed
are kaafir or disbelievers.
Apart from an ideology promoting unjust killing, the
method in which they commit these killings are also ex-
ceptionally brutal. An example to this was their burning
of the Jordanian pilot. This act was claimed to find basis
in the Qur’an, 16:126 prescribing retaliation—Jordanian
jets bombarded Da’esh positions so they burnt him in
retaliation—as well as some narrations (The Washington
Post 2015).
One cannot easily dismiss Da’esh’s claims without a
proper academic refutation towards the Da’esh ideology.
Therefore, numerous scholars or committees around the
world have already issued scholarly refutation against
Da’esh. The Open Letter, however, seems to intend to
bring it to another level.
The Open Letter presents two elements in refuting the
Da’esh ideology. First, it is supposed to represent the
world’s Muslim community uniting as one for no other
purpose than to show the world (the Muslim world, the
non-Muslim world, and Da’esh also) that Da’esh’s twisted
ideology is alone and isolated from the Muslim world.Second, it is a scholarly refutation to show that this is not
just an overwhelming number of Muslims outnumbering
the minority, but that this majority has proper basis for
their claim while Da’esh does not have such proper basis.
This is because differences of opinion in Islamic law are
not settled by majority vote, but by referring to the pri-
mary sources of the Islamic belief, i.e., the Qur’an and
Sunnah to find which opinion is stronger (see the Quran
in 4:59, and Al-Albani 1993: vi-xviii).
Further, seeing that scholars are invited from the entire
world to suggest that the whole Islamic world is against
Da’esh, this is not a mere fatwa (or legal opinion, which is
not binding per se to the community) but rather seems to
be an attempt to achieve a consensus or ijma. The use of
this term has its own significance in Islamic law, since ijma
is a recognized and very authoritative source of Islamic
law after the Qur’an and Sunnah (Hallaq 1997: 75), which
makes it binding to the entire Muslim community inclu-
ding the Da’esh. Al-Shafi’i opines that an ijma must
include the entire Muslim community, while Al-Ghazali
says that such an ijma is practically impossible (at that
time), so only the most qualified scholars count (Khadduri,
1987: 38) which is also the view of Al-Uthaymeen for
a different reason, i.e., because laymen shall not be in-
volved in matters requiring much scholarly knowledge4
(Al-Uthaymeen 2008: 100). This is why the Open Letter
involves a very large number of esteemed Islamic scholars
from various countries.
The Open Letter, in their 24 points of refutation, tried
to capture the main points of where IS ideology is mis-
guided and has resulted in catastrophe.
The first five points relate to general methodology, such
as what are the requirements to issue a fatwa (ruling), the
requirement of mastery of the Arabic language, oversim-
plification, differences of opinion, and taking account of
contemporary times in deriving legal rulings. The Open
Letter essentially points out that the way Da’esh derives
their rulings fail to satisfy these requirements.
From point 6 onwards, the Open Letter refutes IS in
selected topics of Islamic law. The points range from
“Killing Innocents” (point 6) and “Killing Emissaries”
(point 7) to “Emigration” (point 24). The Open Letter then
mentions how Da’esh has violated Islamic laws relating to
those points.
To end the message, the Open Letter sort of “teases”
Da’esh by citing a narration attributed to Ali bin Abi Tha-
lib (one of the major companions of Prophet Muhammad
and the fourth Caliph of Islam) essentially mentioning a
prophecy about the future where there will be “feeble insig-
nificant folk” which, according to the Open Letter, fits
Da’esh.
Finally, there is a list of the 126 scholars (and affiliation)
who signed the document. There are scholars from all
parts of the world, including but not limited to:
Muhammadin Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:11 Page 3 of 10– Africa: HE Sultan Muhammad of Nigeria,
Dr. Sameer Budinar of Morocco
– South Asia: Prof. Din Syamsuddin (Indonesia),
Prof. Osman Bakr (Malaysia)
– Middle East: Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad (Jordan),
Seyyed Abdullah Fadaaq (Saudi Arabia)
– Europe: Wahid al-Fasi al-Fahri (Italy), Abdul-Majeed
Khayroun (Netherlands)
– America: Hamza Yousuf (USA)
Problematic parts
This section will elaborate the problematic parts of the
Open Letter. It will start by elaborating the lack of repre-
sentation in the Open Letter in contrast to what may
seem to be its intention (i.e., to have the Muslim world
united against Da’esh). Then, it will continue discussing
the weaknesses of the arguments set by the Open Letter
by explaining point by point.
A. Representation
The most obvious problem in the list of scholars is
that it suspiciously lacks scholars from the Salafi
creed. The only one that seems to be affiliated to
the Salafi creed is Ali Hasan Al-Halabi from Jordan
(No. 49 in the list of scholars, mentioned in short
as Ali Al-Halabi). Even within the salafis, Al-Halabi
is seen negatively as not representing the Salafi
view. For example, the Saudi Arabia Committee
of Fatwa, which is among the central authorities
in the salafi scholarship, declares that Al-Halabi in
his books calls to the irja sect (Al-Lajnah, nd [a]:
Ftw No. 21517) which is a deviant sect according
to the salafis, labeled as bid’ah or “innovation”
(Al-Lajnah, nd [b]: Ftw No. 21436). It is also
understood that going against bid’ah is essential
in the salafi creed (Qadhi 2013: 2).
There is only one scholar from Saudi Arabia—very
well known to be the center of mainstream salafism
(Qadhi 2013: 6)—which is Seyyed Abdullah Fadaaq
(No. 42 in the list of scholars in the Open Letter).
The one scholar from Saudi Arabia just had to be
a follower of Sufism, which salafis have declared
as a deviant sect (Al-Lajnah, nd [c]: Ftw No. 9848).
Not only that the salafi creed is one of the big
modern creeds which is managing the holy lands
of Mekkah and Madinah, the jihadi groups such
as Al Qaeda and Da’esh also claim to be salafis.
Yasir Qadhi mentions Takfiri Salafis and Radical
Jihadi Salafis—Al Qaeda and Da’esh are typically
listed among those labels—to be among the
sub-creeds of salafism (Qadhi 2013: 8-9).
It is therefore very essential to involve them in
this Open Letter for representation of the entire
Muslim community, while also approaching theIslamic creed whose followers may be the closest
and most prone to joining extremists like Da’esh.
This is why, for example, Al-Halabi is involved in
Indonesia’s efforts to combat radicalism through
its Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
(National Body for Terrorism Anticipation, see
CNN Indonesia 2015). With such necessity, it is
still a wonder why the salafis are very lacking in
the Open Letter (although, separately, the salafi
major scholars and even the Grand Mufti of
Saudi Arabia has issued fatwas against Da’esh).B. The Question of Slavery
The case of slavery is an intriguing one. The start
of the Islamic civilization did not abolish slavery.
There are clear instructions from the Sunnah on
humane treatment of slaves, which includes feeding
and clothing them at the same level as the master,
and the prohibition to overburden a slave, and
that the master shall help the slave in heavy works
(Al-Bukhari 1979a: No. 30 and Muslim 1972c:
No. 4092-4096). It is also prohibited to hit
them without serious fault (Muslim 1972c:
No. 4078-4089) and to force them into prostitution
(Quran, 24:33)
Further, it was highly encouraged to set them
free in various verses of the Qur’an and Sunnah
(such as the Quran, 90:11–13). When the slave
wishes to be set free, all that the slave has to do
is ask for it and even then he/she is entitled to
some wealth from the master upon release
(Quran, 24:33). While there are still some
elements of slavery in Islam that is against
modern human rights, but certainly this cannot
be said in the same breath and level with the
other common practices of slavery.
The majority opinion in medieval scholarship says
that when a Muslim army conquers an army from
the “People of the Book”5, it is up to the Muslim
leader to decide the fate of the war captives:
execution6, release7, or enslavement, based on
what the leader considers to be in the best interest
of the Muslims (Ibn Rushd 2000: 456). This does
seem to be the only way that a person can be
enslaved; therefore, Islamic law according to the
medieval scholars eliminates other but not all
means to enslave people.
The problem in point 12 of the Open Letter with
regard to slavery is not on the substance, as it
have legitimate grounds for its argument. The
problem is the phrases saying that “No scholar
of Islam disputes that one of Islam’s aims is to
abolish slavery…” and “…Muslim consensus on the
prohibition of slavery…”. How can the Open Letter
depart from the opinion of the medieval scholars,
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to their opinion?
To answer this, they seem to use the word
“consensus” or ijma. However, is it true that there
was an ijma on the prohibition of slavery?
The Open Letter seems to refer to the world
movement in abolishing slavery, and the Slavery
Conventions may indeed be among the landmark
events. It is true that a majority of Muslim nations
are parties to the Slavery Conventions in 1926 and
1956. The problem is that the slavery abolition
voice from the Muslim world was not necessarily
through the consensus of scholars, but rather the
leader of nations as parties to the Slavery
Conventions instead of scholars. This is not to
mention that much of the Islamic world at the
time were colonialized (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Indonesia, etc.) and the Ottoman Empire has just
collapsed.
The scholars, on the other hand, are not really
unanimous. The Saudi Arabia Committee of Fatwa
issued a fatwa reaffirming the position of the
medieval majority (Al-Lajnah, nd: Ftw. 1977).
They also issued another fatwa that emphasized
that all Imams (great scholars) agree that this law is
still applicable today (Al-Lajnah, nd [d]: Ftw. 515).
This is apart from Saudi Arabia being party to the
Slavery Conventions8. Even Az-Zuhayli, one of the
most prominent contemporary Shafi'i scholar—despite
the Al-Azhar fatwa (Dar Al-Ifta, [nd])—reaffirms this
position (Az-Zuhayli 2011: 84-86) while also empha-
sizing the need to gradually eliminate slavery
(Az-Zuhayli 1998: 5916).
It is very acceptable for the Open Letter to take
the position of the scholars who are in favor of
eliminating slavery, since the arguments in favor
of this position does find legitimate basis.
However, to claim that there is a universal
consensus is simply far beyond truth. Claiming
“majority” is probably the best, rather than
claiming a universal consensus while
oppositions do exist.C. “Killing Innocents” and Takfir
The Open Letter mentions the prohibition to kill
innocent people in point 6, mentioning how Da’esh
has killed non-combatants simply because they
disagree with Da’esh. It is well understood that
this point has legitimate basis in Islamic law, and
certainly this is a good message to those who are
not well informed on what Islam says about killing
persons who are either non-combatants or have
special status (emissaries). The problem is that
the way these points were carried out are not
convincing or are even—to some extent—naïve.Point 6 on the prohibition to kill innocents is
probably to some extent related to point 8d on
the rules of the conduct of jihad. Since this is
a situation of armed conflict, there are different
rules that apply where some persons are legitimate
targets during war, but it is clear that persons not
taking any participation in the hostilities are not
legitimate targets (see, for example, in Malik 1992:
21/10, and Az-Zuhayli 2011: 34-35). The problem
is that Da’esh thinks that these non-combatants
deserve to be killed for another reason.
Some of the persons (combatants and
non-combatants alike) were killed due to Da’esh
declaring them as apostates. Now this issue
becomes very linked to point 6 of the Open Letter
regarding the question of takfir (declaring a person
as a non-Muslim). The Open Letter did make a
sufficient explanation on the Islamic laws regarding
takfir in general, but did not seem to refer to Da’esh
ideology of takfir in particular or connect it with
the issue of “killing innocents”.
An example to Da’esh ideology on takfir was
mentioned in Part II, i.e., how they declare
participants of democracy and civil laws as
apostates. While it is true that the Qur’an in 5:44
says that persons not following the laws of Allah
are disbelievers, this verse cannot be seen in
isolation and absent context. The Open Letter
points out that “not using Allah’s laws” do not
always fall under disbelief (kufr), rather it may also
fall under fusuq (evildoers) or wickedness (dhulm)
as per the Qur’an in 5: 45 and 47.
However, not only that this was explained in
a separate part of the Open Letter (i.e., point 21
on Rebelling against Leader), this argument is
insufficiently comprehensive in capturing
Da’esh’s ideology.
First, The Open Letter has not refuted the Da’esh’s
blanket judgment that democracy is against Islam
is a form of apostasy. There is a rich body of
scholarship on this matter, and numerous fatwas
around the world supporting this that could be
cited (see Samuddin 2013: 387-414 for a long list
of fatwas on the permissibility of democracy).
Second, the Open Letter did not take into account
that Da’esh has made a distinction between
“not using the laws of Allah” resulting in takfir
and merely a “lesser disbelief” not resulting in
takfir (Muqarrar fi al-Tawhid, nd: 35-37)9.
These points have to be addressed and refuted
or else the Open Letter’s argument is refuted
before delivered.
Another interesting example of Da’esh ideology of
takfir is that takfir is not performed on those who
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nd: 4). The Open Letter in point 6 has noted that
innocents have been killed for exactly this reason,
but did not link it to takfir while Da’esh cases of
civilian murders are highly related to it. It is
paramount to assess these Da’esh claims of their
takfir ideology. It would certainly be more
powerful to point out how Da’esh fails to
live up to their own claim.
Pointing out these instances of reckless takfir
resulting in the “killing of innocents”, as mentioned
previously, would bring more substance and factual
contexts to the arguments of the Open Letter. On
the other hand, the point on takfir does seem to
explore much of theory but not any particular
action of Da’esh making reckless takfir except one.
The one case mentioned was that of a Da’esh
fighter killing persons claiming to be Muslims but
failing to answer basic Islamic questions. While this
is also a case of reckless takfir, it may easily be seen
rather as a case of weeding out impostors. Pointing
out systematic evidences of IS committing takfir
defeating their own principles would send a much
stronger message.D. Points on Jihad
Jihad seems to be a large part of what Da’esh is
calling to. They call all Muslims to join the fight
against the disbelievers (Al-Baghdadi 2014). The
Open Letter attempts to refute Da’esh ideology
on jihad on a number of levels, which are mostly
in point 8. Included among them would be rules
on intentions, reasons, and goals of jihad, persons
protected during warfare, treatment of war
captives, and also the protection of emissaries
(albeit in a separate point, i.e., point 7).
Half of the problem of this section lies, again, on
which part of jihad rules Da’esh did not follow.
The Open Letter mentions in point 8a with regard
to “intention behind jihad” essentially that jihad
has to be for Allah only. However, it does not
mention what evidences show that Da’esh does
jihad for any other intention. What is more is
that if the Open Letter even attempts to infer such
intentions, they will risk contradicting their own
argument in point 9c mentioning that one may
not recklessly interpret another’s intention.
With regard to rules on the reason of jihad,
the Open Letter essentially mentions in 8b that
jihad should be done only to fight transgression
or oppression and that there is no such thing as
offensive jihad. The first problem to this is that
Da’esh easily mentions how their acts are responses
to oppression by tyrant governments, such as what
they have claimed in Iraq in 2013 while still usingthe name ISIS (At-Tamimi 2013). Al Baghdadi has
also elaborated on how the world seems to be
attacking Muslims on all fronts to justify his call
to fight (Al-Baghdadi 2014). Certainly, the Open
Letter should have realized and responded to this
fact.
But then, Da’esh cannot deny either that the war
they are fighting is also expansive. After all, their
slogan “baqiyah wa tatamaddad” does mean
“lasting and expanding”. The Open Letter does
mention that not all scholars (albeit majority)
say that there is no offensive jihad. Medieval
scholars have agreed that jihad is fardh
al-kifayah10 (ibn Rushd 2000: 454 and 464),
and even modern scholars such as az-Zuhayli
mentioned the same, further explaining that jihad
is fardh al-kifayah when the non-Muslims are in
their own land—which may imply offensive jihad
(Az-Zuhayli 2011: 29).
However, despite the difference of opinions,
all of those speak of jihad against the kuffar or
disbelievers. It is well known that Da’esh has on
so many occasions attacked fellow Sunni fighters
from either the Free Syrian Army, Kurdish groups,
or other jihadi groups. IS easily justifies this by
making takfir on these fellow Muslims, so
technically they are not attacking Muslims—in
their own perspective. This is more evidence not
only on how dangerous the Da’esh ideology of
takfir is, but also on how few facts on the field
that the Open Letter manages to incorporate to
strengthen their critic towards Da’esh.
Point 8d mentions about the rules of conduct
of jihad, and the author wishes to mention
particularly the argument regarding the treatment
towards war captives where Da’esh has executed
numerous captives. The Open Letter is indeed
correct when pointing out that Prophet
Muhammad did not kill captives during battle
except in special circumstances (i.e., towards
persons committing special crimes and not for
mere belligerency), also that it is encouraged to
treat the war captives well and provide amnesty.
However, what to make out of this as precedent?
Does it mean that there is a blanket prohibition
to execute war captives for mere belligerency?
This is indeed the position of the modern scholar
Al-Qardhawi (2010: 708-710) and of some
medieval scholars (Ibn Rushd 2000: 456).
However, this position even in the medieval
scholarship seems to be a minority. The majority
said, as mentioned much earlier, that it is within
the discretion of the Muslim leader to determine
the fate of the war captives which includes
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best interest of the Muslims (Ibn Rushd 2000: 456).
Modern scholars say the same, such as the Saudi
Arabia Committee of Fatwa (Al-Lajnah, nd: Ftw.
No. 515 and 1977) and Az-Zuhayli (2011: 87-88
and 1998: 5913-5914). Most Islamic nations have
become party to international humanitarian law
treaties which prohibit summary executions of
war captives, and—unlike the ijma which requires
scholars—this decision lies on the leaders. Yet this
also means that it is in the discretion of the leader
of Da’esh to execute these prisoners. Does it make
sense to easily take the opinion of the minority
scholars and ignore the majority, when many
argue that “Da’esh does not represent the majority
of Muslims”? This may show that Da’esh follows
the majority and anti-Da’esh scholars follow the
minority, possibly implying that Da’esh is more
authoritative.
It may be best to address the majority opinion
honestly and reconcile it with the minority. For
example, following the line of the majority, how
does one decide that executing war captives is in
the best interest of the Muslims? By following the
precedent of Prophet Muhammad, who sees that
there is interest to execute war captives only when
they have committed special crimes apart from
mere participation in belligerency—conforming
also to the minority opinion.
Further, it would be important to point out that
Da’esh has violated even the opinion that they
claim to follow. The Human Rights Council
(2016: 14-15) reported that there has been
numerous summary executions in detainment
facilities, clearly without any instruction from
the leader of Da’esh but acts of individuals. As
mentioned above, the scholars of the past and
present rule that captives may be executed by
the discretion of the leader and not individual
soldiers. Therefore, it may seem that Da’esh’s
conduct is following no legitimate scholar.
Last in this category would be point 7 on the
prohibition of killing emissaries. It is true that
Islam prohibits killing an emissary, even one that
belongs to the adverse party (Hamidullah 2011:
151, see also Abu Dawud 2008: No. 2755). The
problem is that the context of the aforementioned
rules refers to diplomatic representatives or envoys.
Interpreting the word “emissary” let alone the law
relating to it to include journalists may be a very
far stretch. If one were to play with loose
definitions, Da’esh can easily respond by saying
that even honest reports of Da’esh activity helps
encouraging the west to attack further thereforeparticipating in the hostilities—practically
making the journalists a legitimate target
(see Az-Zuhayli 1998: 5855).
The Open Letter also mentioned that aid workers
such as David Haines are supposed to fall under
the category of emissaries as well. Can aid workers
from NGOs can count as “emissaries” which
deserve special immunity alike diplomatic
representatives? This will require some extra
explanation, which certainly deserves to be
mentioned. Instead, the Open Letter once again
resorted to very loose definitions of aid workers
as “… emissaries of mercy and kindness…”.
However, rather than insisting on putting
unconventional occupations under the category
of “emissary”, it would be much more simple to
generally classify them under the “non-combatant”
classification pursuant to point 6 on “innocent
people” or point 8d on “rules governing jihad”
specifically on persons that should not be targeted
during war.E. The Question of Emigration
The final point of the Open Letter, i.e., point 24,
seeks to refute the Da’esh call for emigration or
hijrah of Muslims from wherever they are to the
land Da’esh controls. Al Baghdadi himself has
made this call and pointed out that it is compulsory
to emigrate to Da’esh (Al-Baghdadi 2014). Note
that a large number of extremists from all over
the world have answered this call and entered
Iraq and Syria to join Da’esh, although there is a
decrease in numbers of those joining them now
(Foreign Affairs 2016).
In its refutation, the Open Letter uses a narration
from Prophet Muhammad saying “There is no
emigration after the Conquest [of Mecca], but jihad
and [its] intention [remain]. And when you are
called to war, march forward.”. From what it seems,
this narration is understood by the Open Letter to
mean that Da’esh call to emigration will be against
Prophet Muhammad’s call to no longer emigrate.
The problem with this is that there is another
narration of Prophet Muhammad saying “Migration
will not end until repentance ends, and repentance
will not end until the sun rises in the west.”
(Abu Dawud 2008: No. 2473). In the Islamic belief,
the reference of “…the sun rises in the west…”
is one of the signs of the end of days
(Al-Bukhari 1979b: 68). How do we understand
these seemingly two contradictory narrations?
Al-Shafi’i mentions that there are no contradictive
narrations. Narrations that seem contradictive
would have different context of application,
such as one narration referring to a general
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specific circumstances (Khadduri 1987: 180-181).
Although there are instances where certain
narrations would abrogate the other, Al-Shafi’i
also explains that would usually be clear evidences
in that narration indicating such abrogation.
This should be seen together with Al-Uthaymeen’s
position, where he mentioned that one would
resort to seeking possible abrogation only when
the narrations cannot be reconciled
(Al-Uthaymeen 2008: 85)
Particularly regarding these two narrations, the two
narrations apply to different contexts.
Al-Uthaymeen mentioned that the first narration
“There is no emigration after the Conquest…” speaks
only about emigration from Makkah and was not
intended to be a general rule (Al-Uthaymeen 2002:
9). The second narration “Emigration will not
end…” explains how the general command of
emigration has not ceased. The concept of
emigration in Islam is to emigrate from “lands of
disbelief” to the lands of Islam (Al-Uthaymeen
2002:10). Having said that, two narrations are not
contradictive after all. Makkah used to be a hostile
“land of disbelief” towards the Muslims which was
why Muslims emigrated to Madinah. Therefore,
after the Muslims took over Makkah, it is no longer
a “land of disbelief”, which still satisfies the concept
of emigration.
It is therefore baseless to refute Da’esh’s call for
emigration by saying that “the command to
emigrate is no more”, and scholars should know
better. It may seem so much persuasive to refute
Da’esh in this topic by pointing out that the
majority of the world’s Muslims are already living
in Muslim lands. Except, of course, Da’esh declares
these Muslim-majority nations as “lands of
disbelief”. This goes back to the point of Takfir
which is a separate area of refutation.
Another point to mention is that there are also a lot
of Muslims living in the “lands of disbelief” and
sometimes even persecuted such as the Rohingya
Muslims in Myanmar. However, one can easily argue
that even when these Muslims should emigrate, they
should do so to a Muslim land and this Open Letter
should be full of arguments as to why Da’esh does
not fall under that category. Even the caliphate
claims have been properly refuted in point 22.F. The Athar of ‘Ali
The Open Letter ends with a narration attributed to
Ali bin Abi Thalib. The full text of this narration is:
When you see the black flags, remain where you are
and do not move your hands or your feet. Thereafterthere shall appear a feeble insignificant folk. Their
hearts will be like fragments of iron. They will have
the state. They will fulfill neither covenant nor
agreement. They will call to the truth, but they
will not be people of the truth. Their names will be
parental attributions, and their aliases will be derived
from towns. Their hair will be free-flowing like that
of women. This situation will remain until they differ
among themselves. Thereafter, God will bring forth
the Truth through whomever He wills.
In that same page, the Open Letter interprets this
narration so that it fits Da’esh’s characteristics:
– “… black flags …”: Da’esh’s flag is black
– “… feeble and insignificant folk …” : weakness
in understanding religion and morality.
– “… hearts will be like fragments of iron…”:
i.e., massacre of captives and torture
– “… they will have the state…”: Da’esh claims
to establish an Islamic State
– “… fulfill neither covenant nor agreement…”:
Da’esh has betrayed some agreements
– “… call to the truth but they will not be people
of the truth…” : Da’esh calls to Islam but are not
merciful as Prophet Muhammad instructed
– “… names will be parental attributions and their
aliases will be derived from towns. Their hair will
be free-flowing like that of women…”: this fits the
description of many known Da’esh fighters.
– “…until they disagree among themselves…”:
Da’esh fights its own “parent”, i.e., the Al Nusra
Front (Al Qaeda in Syria).
The “… remain where you are…” part, according
to the Open Letter, is to be understood as “do not
join them”.
Certain parts of the Open Letter interpretation to
this narration are incorrect. For example, parental
attributions in names such as Abu Muhammad or
Umm Rayhanah (Father of Muhammad or Mother
of Rayhanah) which, in Arabic, is known as kunyah.
Also, aliases derived from towns such Al-Tunis
or Al-Baghdadi (The Tunisian or The Baghdadi).
It is correct that lots of IS members are known
with such attributes to their names. However,
using kunyah names is part of Islamic teachings
as an act of mustahab or “encouraged but not
compulsory” (An-Nawawi 1427 H: 8/254-255).
Using towns in names is something that many
Muslims do including famous scholars. For
example, Imam Al-Bukhari, Imam An-Nasai,
Nassirudin Al-Bani Ahmad Khattib
Al-Minangkabawi, Mahmoud al-Misri, Ali
Al-Halabi (who is in the list of scholars of the
Open Letter), and so many others. Why is the
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matters?
However, the worst part of this is to see this
narration from the perspective of hadeeth sciences.
This narration is known as mawquf narration:
a companion saying or doing something, different
from marfu’ narration: a companion narrating from
Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, it is prima facie
dubious that this narration contains a prophecy
which is a matter of the unseen or ghaib, which
in Islam is only known from the Qur’an or from
Prophet Muhammad (marfu’ narrations). Scholars
have mentioned that the companions of Prophet
Muhammad cannot say such matters unless they
must have heard it from Prophet Muhammad
himself but just not narrating them in the manner
of other marfu’ narrations. Therefore, mawquf
narrations containing ghaib matters are ruled as
marfu’ narrations or known as marfu’ hukman
(Ath-Thahhan 1415 H: 98-100). But can we
accept this?
Any person who is learned in Islam should know
that there are heavy restrictions on whether or not
we can accept narrations like this and take it into
account. As a general rule, all statements or actions
attributed to Prophet Muhammad contained in
these kinds of narrations must undergo a careful
study on its chain of narrators to be graded based
on its authenticity. If the narration is proven to
be authentic, only then it can be taken into
consideration (Al-Uthaymeen 2008: 98).
The narration cited in the Open Letter was taken
from Kitab Al Fitan by Nu’aym bin Hammad, one
of the teachers of the most famous hadeeth
compiler Imam Al-Bukhari. However, the scholars
of hadeeth have a negative opinion on Nu’aym
bin Hammad himself. He is known as a weak
transmitter of hadeeth and some even allege him
as a fabricator, and his book Kitab al-Fitan in
specifically mentioned to contain fabricated and
dubious narrations and therefore must not be used
as basis for anything (see for example: Adz-Dzahabi
2006: 10/609). Does this mean absolute rejection?
Sometimes, narrations with weak proof of
authenticity can be accepted with very strict
requirements. Anshari Taslim (2015: 8-9) mentions
that these requirements must include:
 That the weakness of authenticity must not be
fatal,
 That the narration only speaks of virtuous acts
or fadhilah amal, nothing about law or belief
(aqeeda),
 That, in using the narration, it shall not be said
with certainty that Prophet Muhammad did orsaid it, for example it should be said “there is a
narration that say that Prophet Muhammad
said..” as opposed to “Prophet Muhammad said..”
It is clear that only one of the criteria is satisfied,
i.e., the third. Certainly, this criteria should be seen
differently, since it refers to a rule that specifically
prohibits lying in the name of Prophet Muhammad
(Muslim 1972a: No.1-4), and this narration is not
directly attributed, although of course lying in
general is also prohibited (Muslim 1972b: No.
2607c). However, similarly, since this particular
narration is ruled as marfu’ hukman then it is likely
that similar care should be given. The Open Letter
only mentions that Nu’aym bin Hammad narrates
such a statement from Ali bin Abi Thalib.
However, the other criteria are not satisfied. In
terms of quality of authenticity, fabrication is
considered as a fatal weakness to authenticity
(Taslim 2015: 8). In terms of scope of material,
the content of this narration does not fall under
the exception of fadhilah amal but rather the
ghaib—which is part of aqeeda. Therefore, this
narration should not be accepted.
With such fatal weakness, why was this narration
brought up in the first place? The Author still
wonders. It is so ironic since “using weak
narrations” was also used by the Al-Azhar
Committee of Fatwa in refuting Da’esh in another
case, i.e., the burning of the Jordanian Pilot
(Dar al Ifta, nd[b]). Bear in mind also that the
list of scholars signing Open Letter includes ten
members of the Al-Azhar Committee of Fatwa.
There are better and more authentic narrations
to point at Da’esh, such as the following:
Narrated Yusair bin `Amr: I asked Sahl bin Hunaif,
“Did you hear the Prophet saying anything
about Al-Khawarij?” He said, “I heard him saying
while pointing his hand towards Iraq.” There will ap-
pear in it (i.e., Iraq) some people who will recite the
Qur’an but it will not go beyond their throats, and
they will go out from (leave) Islam as an arrow darts
through the game’s body. (Al-Bukhari 1979b: No. 68)
The Al-Khawarij is labeled as a deviant sect
originally appearing not long after Prophet
Muhammad died and was responsible of the
murder of Ali bin Abi Thalib as the fourth Caliph.
They easily make takfir on Muslims who commit
sins and would encourage rebellion against rulers
(As-Shalabi 1429 H: 13-14).
Numerous scholars and even Fatwa Committees
have declared Da’esh as Al-Khawarij, such as the
Saudi Arabian senior scholar Abdul Muhsin
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Council of Canada (2015). Even Al Qaeda
sympethizers such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
declares the same (Republika 2014).
This narration is also a prophecy, where Prophet
Muhammad hints that the Al-Khawarij will come
from Iraq. Although the original Al-Khawarij
movement in the seventh century AD actually did
start in Iraq, yet this prophecy may have predicted
a similar movement coming from Iraq. Before
Da’esh and before ISIS, they were the Islamic State
of Iraq under Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi established
in 2007, before that they were Al Qaeda in Iraq,
and before that they were Jamaat Al Tawhid wa
al Jihad also in Iraq (At-Tamimi 2015a: 117).
Would this not be a better insult towards Da’esh?Conclusions
This article is not in any way suggesting that the Muslim
world shall not rally against extremism, and certainly not
suggesting either that Da’esh cannot be refuted. There is
indeed a large case against Da’esh, and the “ideology war”
continues. Numerous scholars or fatwa committees have
individually analyzed and refuted Da’esh. Scholars are work-
ing together with governments and communities to combat
Islamic extremism so that Da’esh will find themselves with
lesser supporters and eventually die out. For example, as
mentioned previously, Indonesian Da’esh supporters have
repented after approached by Islamic scholars.
The numbers of people joining Da’esh are on the decline
(Foreign Affairs 2016) while defection from it is on the rise
(Inquisitr 2015). There are yet to be any studies directly
linking the Open Letter to these phenomena, although
clearly it is not among the top motivations of the latter. It is
hoped, however, that the Open Letter can contribute into
the already existing general movement against Da’esh and
extremism. Further, it may serve as a declaration to the
world that Muslims all over the world is against Da’esh and
their ideology and therefore one shall not easily attribute
the acts of Da’esh to the Islamic faith.
The author merely regrets the irony of the Open Letter.
It could have been a monumental masterpiece of the most
brilliant minds of the Muslims of the world brought
together in one letter, paving a smoother path to destroy-
ing Da’esh and their extreme ideology. If that was indeed
the intention, certainly it should (a) not leave out impor-
tant actors relevant to the subject matter, and (b) present
accurate and honest analysis regarding the issue dealt
with. With such grand range or participation and high
profile signatories, is it not an embarrassment if the Open
Letter fails to fulfill those two points?
While Al Ghazali mentioned that an ijma was
difficult due to practical difficulties of the past world
(Khadduri 1987: 38), globalization and the luxuries ofmodern day technology makes a proper ijma so much
more feasible. Why harm this by deliberately ignoring im-
portant actors—in this case the Salafi scholars? It is
understood that the reason Al-Ghazali and Al-Uthaymeen
argued that an ijma should involve only the qualified
scholars and exclude the laymen is due to the need of
quality analysis of Islamic law. Why harm this with mis-
takes that the most qualified scholars should have been
able to avoid?
It is the author’s hope that a new letter could be
authored. This new letter shall learn from its predeces-
sor and not make the same mistakes.Endnotes
1At the height of Al Qaeda’s fame as the no. 1 enemy,
they did not have an army. However, in recent develop-
ments, Al Qaeda branches Jabhat al-Nusra (Syria) and Al
Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ended up forming
armies to defeat the Syrian government (or the Houthi
rebels, in case of the AQAP). Yet during this period, they
are not known to commit acts of terror like Da’esh.
2This report makes no summary of worldwide Muslims
against Da’esh but mentions individual States. For example,
almost 100 % of Lebanon is against Da’esh (compared to
less than 1 % saying “don’t know”), 84 % of the Palestinian
territories (6 % in favor), 79 % of Indonesia (6 % in favor),
and 94 % of Jordan (3 % in favor).
3This is a Da’esh issued document authored by Turki
Binali at p. 37 and has been documented and translated
by At-Tamimi (2015b)
4To deduce laws and present fatwas, it is required that
the scholar should have knowledge on the legal basis of
the Qur’an and Hadeeth (and knowledge of its authenti-
city or lack thereof) and able to derive rulings from them,
has knowledge of nasikh-mansukh (abrogation), princi-
ples of ushul al fiqh such as taksheesh (specific rules over-
riding general ones), and mastery of the Arabic language
(Al-Uthaymeen 2008: 128-129)
5i.e., Christians or Jews
6Only for military-aged men
7Can be in exchange for ransom or unconditional
8And probably this is why Saudi scholars were not in-
volved in the Open Letter
9See also Fatwa Committee of Da’esh in Raqqa, Jihad
and its Rulings, Fatwa No. 20 regarding those fighting
alongside the Free Syrian Army, documented and trans-
lated by At-Tamimi (2015c)
10Communal obligation, meaning that some Muslims—
but not all—must do it. Or else, the entire Muslim com-
munity will bear the sin.
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